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Abstract
Inside debt, such as pensions and deferred compensation, constitutes a widely-used form
of executive compensation, yet the the valuation and incentive eﬀects of these instruments
have been almost entirely overlooked by prior work. Our paper initiates this line of research
by studying CEO pension arrangements in a sample of 237 large capitalization ﬁrms. Among
our ﬁndings are that CEO compensation in most large cap ﬁrms exhibits a balance between
debt- and equity-based incentives, with the balance shifting systematically away from equity
and toward debt as CEOs grow older; that annual increases in pension entitlements represent
about 10% of overall compensation for the CEOs in our sample, and about 15% for CEOs
aged 61 to 65; that CEOs with high debt-based incentives manage their ﬁrms conservatively
to reduce default risk; and that pension plan compensation strongly inﬂuences patterns of
CEO turnover and CEO cash compensation.
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Ayalur and Hae Jin Chung provided excellent research assistance.1 Introduction
In the nearly three decades since the publication of Jensen and Meckling (1976), a vast aca-
demic literature has emerged on executive compensation. A predominant focus of this literature
has been equity-based compensation, paid in the form of restricted stock, stock options, and
other instruments whose value is tied to future equity returns. Empirically, the growing role
of equity-based compensation has been widely documented as part of research examining pay-
versus-performance for corporate executives. On the theoretical front, the literature has sought
both a justiﬁcation for linking managerial pay to equity and the potential consequences of such
a link for managerial incentives and other issues. Implicit in virtually all of this research is that
managerial compensation consists of only two components: cash and equity-linked instruments.
For example, Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) ask
Why are managers’ monetary incentives ...traditionally correlated with the value of
equity rather than the value of debt? That is, why does compensation meant to
maximize ﬁrm value have managers paid in stocks rather than as a function of ﬁrm
value?
Overlooked almost entirely is the widespread practice of paying top managers with debt. Many
executives in the US work in exchange for promises from their ﬁrms to pay them ﬁxed sums of
cash in the future. The most common form of these intra-company IOUs (“inside debt” in the
language of Jensen and Meckling, 1976) are deﬁned-beneﬁt pensions and deferred compensation.
As we document in this paper, the amounts involved are signiﬁcant in many ﬁrms, especially the
largest and oldest.
For ﬁrms that use pensions and deferred compensation, the implications of substantial inside
debt holdings by executives are numerous. By aﬀecting both the overall level of compensation
and its composition, inside debt alters managerial incentives in many directions. It should, for
example, have an impact on the size of the ﬁrm’s payouts, the composition of these payouts
(dividends versus share repurchases), the ﬁrm’s cost of debt and its capital structure, the choice
of new securities to be issued (debt versus equity), project choice, capital expenditure, and the
incentive to pursue diversifying mergers, among many other things. From a theoretical standpoint,
it also raises the question of when and whether such debt-holding could be part of an optimal
compensation package.
This paper takes a ﬁrst, largely empirical, step in exploring the nature and implications of
debt-based compensation for CEOs of large US companies. Because disclosure for deferred
compensation plans is limited, out of necessity most of our analysis focuses on CEO pension
plans. (Even for pensions, information is not readily available as we explain later in the paper.)
We begin with an example that illustrates and motivates the material to come.
1A Case Study: Jack Welch of General Electric
Table I presents data about the annual evolution of the pension and deferred compensation of
perhaps the most famous CEO in American business, John F. Welch Jr. of General Electric Co.
Data appears annually for the last nine years of Welch’s career, along with information about his
direct compensation and equity ownership.
Welch’s debt-based compensation was a signiﬁcant part of his overall pay. Incremental yearly
increases in his pension entitlement, when valued using standard actuarial methods, ranged as
high as $24.8 million during the period shown, exceeding his cash salary and bonus compensation
in each of his last ﬁve working years. By the time Welch retired, General Electric owed him $170
million between the present value of his pension and his deferred compensation.
The growth of Welch’s pension value accelerated in his ﬁnal years of oﬃce. This pattern is
directly linked to the service-based, deﬁned beneﬁt formula underlying most CEO pensions. It
provides clear incentives for CEOs to remain working until the minimum age for pension payout
and also to manage the ﬁrm in their latter years in a way that preserves the value of the pension.
In particular, one might expect CEOs to reduce ﬁrm risk as they accumulate seniority and their
pension values grow.
Welch’s cash compensation also grew substantially after he turned 60 in 1995, and he received
a very large equity award as well in that year. General Electric permits retirement at age 60 with
full pension beneﬁts. To provide incentives to managers to keep working beyond that age, one
would expect the company to increase compensation in order to make them whole for the pension
beneﬁts they sacriﬁce by not retiring. This appears to have happened with Welch.
Welch’s “debt-equity ratio”—the ratio of his inside debt holding to his equity (stock and
option) holding—ranged between 0.07 and 0.27 during the period shown, which was well below
the company’s overall debt/equity ratio during the same period. Having the CEO invested in
both debt and equity claims against the company provides a mechanism for mitigating the agency
costs of debt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), but very large CEO holdings of inside debt may lead
to an overly conservative management style. It is possible that the large equity awards Welch
received in his ﬁnal years in oﬃce were partly intended to counteract the incentives for conservative
management that would otherwise have arisen from his large pension value.
Welch’s pension structure and holdings of inside debt are not exceptional.1 This paper inves-
1The level of Welch’s compensation is not typical of most CEOs—his pension is by far the highest in our
sample—but the balance between his inside debt and equity holdings and their evolution over time are quite
typical among CEOs. Probably the most valuable pensions among active CEOs today are held by Lee R. Raymond
of Exxon Mobil Corp. and Edward E. Whitacre Jr. of SBC communications Inc., each of whose pension has an
actuarial present value betwen $50 and $60 million. Raymond also holds about $350 million worth of shares and
options in his company, while Whitacre’s equity holdings are considerably lower, not too far from parity with his
pension value.
2tigates CEO pensions in the US and ﬁnds that these patterns of are present more generally in
the data. The rest of this section elaborates.
This Paper’s Contribution
Our sample involves CEO compensation for 237 Fortune 500 companies over a seven-year period
between 1996 and 2002. Following a discussion of the related literature in Section 2, Section 3
describes the common rules used to determine CEO pensions.
Our analysis opens in Section 4 by describing our sample and highlighting the importance
of pensions in CEOs’ compensation structure for our sample companies. Of the many features
described here, two bear particular emphasis. First, we show that increases in the actuarial value
of pensions constitute a signiﬁcant component of overall compensation for many CEOs. For
example, for the CEOs in the age group 61-65 in our sample, the pension component of overall
compensation is on average 30 percent larger than the base salary and is 21 percent of the size
of equity compensation. Second, the importance of the pension component of compensation
increases monotonically with age. As a consequence, the balance between debt and equity
incentives for CEOs shifts in a clear pattern away from equity and toward debt as they grow
older. For instance, only 7 percent of the CEOs in our sample who are aged between 51 and 55
have debt-equity ratios exceeding their company’s debt-equity ratios, but for CEOs in the age
group 61-65, this rises to 22 percent.
Though our sample is dominated by large capitalization ﬁrms with long, successful histories, we
believe our results about the importance of CEO pensions apply to a much wider circle of ﬁrms.
Tabulations from the ExecuComp database, discussed in greater detail below (see Section 4),
indicate that service-based, deﬁned beneﬁt pensions are held by about one-fourth of the CEOs of
small capitalization ﬁrms, about one-third of the CEOs of mid-sized ﬁrms, and more than half the
CEOs of ﬁrms in the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index. These statistics underestimate the frequency
of pension compensation, since other CEOs have pensions negotiated separately in employment
contracts or derived from diﬀerent types of formulas. In light of the importance of the pension
component of executive compensation, we ﬁnd it surprising that companies in the US (unlike
their U.K. counterparts) are not required to report pension values explicitly and in greater detail.
We comment further on this issue in Section 4.
Section 5 looks to identify important variables that determine or correlate with (a) the value
of a CEO’s earned pension, and (b) the CEO’s ratio of debt-to-equity holdings. We consider a
large set of variables suggested by contracting theory and intuition, including the ﬁrm’s leverage,
growth opportunities, tax status, liquidity position, and several others. We ﬁnd that the ﬁrm’s
leverage is positively related to the CEO’s pension value. The CEO’s years of tenure with the
ﬁrm also exhibits a positive association with both the pension value and ratio of debt to equity
3pay, as does the age of the ﬁrm and an indicator variable for whether the CEO was hired from
outside.
Section 6 turns to a topic that has received considerable coverage in the compensation litera-
ture, CEO turnover (e.g., Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988) and Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino
(2004)). We examine the role of the payout schedule for pensions in this context and ﬁnd that
it acts as a critical determinant of turnover: Holding constant age and other variables, we ﬁnd
that CEOs become much more likely to retire once their pensions become fully payable. Though
the results are strongest in the year in which CEOs turn 65, when mandatory retirement policies
go into eﬀect for many ﬁrms, we ﬁnd evidence that pension availability increases CEO turnover
at every age above 60. Moreover, for CEOs who do not retire when pensions become payable,
we ﬁnd that they collect additional cash compensation that leaves them almost exactly whole for
each dollar of foregone pension income. These results have special signiﬁcance since the role of
pensions has not thus far been highlighted in the literature on CEO turnover.
Finally, in Section 7, we study the agency costs of debt stemming from the “asset-substitution”
or “risk-shifting” incentives of equity-holding CEOs. Such incentives are dampened when the
CEO holds debt in the company, so, ceteris paribus, debt-based compensation should reduce the
riskiness of the ﬁrm’s external debt. We test for this implication. As our metric of risk, we use the
ﬁrm’s “distance-to-default,” which is, loosely speaking, the number of standard deviation moves
in the ﬁrm’s value required to put the ﬁrm in default. (A higher distance-to-default indicates
a lower likelihood of default.) The notion of distance-to-default as capturing default risk was
popularized in the Moody’s KMV implementation of Merton’s (1974) model and is now widely
accepted as a good ordinal proxy for default risk. We ﬁnd the data backs the theory. As CEO
pension values increase relative to their equity values, risk-taking as measured by distance-to-
default declines. A ﬁrm’s distance-to-default is 0.3 to 0.4 standard deviations higher when the
CEO’s personal debt-equity ratio exceeds his company’s debt-equity ratio.
We believe our paper is the ﬁrst to highlight the importance of debt-based compensation as
an element of top management contracts, and also the ﬁrst to call attention to the underlying
incentive and governance implications of these schemes. Our concluding remarks in Section 8
point to a number of open questions, both theoretical and empirical, beyond those addressed in
this paper.
2 Literature Review
The large theoretical literature that has developed around managerial compensation and agency
problems has seen a number of models justify the use of equity in a manager’s compensation
package. However, the possibility of using debt instruments for management compensation has
4received little attention.
In general, the impact of debt and equity holdings on the manager’s incentives depends on
the capital structure of the ﬁrm itself. Begining with Jensen and Meckling (1976), several papers
have examined the design of the “ownership structure” of a ﬁrm, deﬁned as the combination of
the ﬁrm’s capital structure and the composition of its managerial compensation. The canonical
model involves an “owner-manager” who seeks to raise outside ﬁnancing (outside debt and/or
equity) to fund a project. The objective is to choose these components optimally to minimize
deadweight losses from agency. We discuss some of these papers in this section.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) consider an owner-manager who retains an equity interest in the
ﬁrm which forms his sole compensation. They note that outside equity ﬁnance creates moral
hazard concerns: The manager bears the full cost of eﬀort expended in generating returns but
receives only a part of the rewards, so he does not have adequate incentives to expend optimal
eﬀort. Outside debt, on the other hand, creates risk-shifting problems: The manager, as the
holder of a convex residual claim on the ﬁrm, has an incentive to suboptimally increase the
riskiness of the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows. Deadweight costs result in either case that preclude ﬁrst-best
outcomes.
Jensen and Meckling do not, for the most part, consider including debt in the manager’s
compensation, except for a brief section in which they note that having the manager hold debt
and equity in the same ratio as they appear in the ﬁrm’s capital structure eliminates the risk-
shifting problems associated with outside debt.2
Jensen and Meckling consider the problems of outside debt and outside equity separately (their
framework does not encompass eﬀort-avoidance and risk-shifting possibilities simultaneously) so
they do not discuss the optimality of debt compensation in general or its impact on the moral
hazard problem. Hellwig (1994) studies a generalization of the Jensen-Meckling framework that
simultaneously admits both shirking and risk-shifting.
Matters are much more complex in Hellwig’s model; for example, the manager can hide a low
eﬀort choice behind a high risk choice. Hellwig ﬁnds that under certain conditions, the optimal
contract involves the issue of outside debt and outside equity; the manager holds the residual
equity but still does not hold debt. Other more complex (and less reasonable) outcomes are
possible in Hellwig’s model, but none are discussed which involve the manager holding debt.
The Jensen-Meckling and Hellwig frameworks focus on the diﬀerent patterns of income
streams generated by diﬀerent securities (and their consequent incentive eﬀects) but do not
pay much attention to the control rights conferred by these securities. In practice, a speciﬁc
2Controlling the problems of risk-shifting leads to an empirical prediction that the amount of equity pay for a
manager should vary inversely with ﬁrm leverage. See the model of John and John (1993) and empirical evidence
in numerous papers such as Bryan, Hwang, and Lilien (2000) and Ortiz-Molina (2004).
5correlation is observed: equityholders, the holders of junior convex claims, control the ﬁrm in
good states of the world, while debtholders, the holders of senior concave claims, control the
ﬁrm in bad states. Motivated by this, Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) describe a model in which
multiple outside investors hold diverse securities (outside debt and outside equity), and there is
control by debtholders in bad states and by equityholders in good states.3 In the optimal contract
in the Dewatripont-Tirole model, managerial compensation is tied to equity value, rather than
to ﬁrm value; debt is once again not a part of the compensation package. Loosely put, under
the optimal incentive scheme, managers need to be punished when they take low eﬀort levels,
so control should pass to debtholders who have an incentive to choose actions that hurt the
equity-holding manager.
It is possible that the literature’s focus on rationalizing a congruence of interests between
the manager and equityholders stems from the widely-held belief that compensation schemes
in practice exhibit such alignment. However, the empirical evidence we present in this paper
indicates that senior managers’ interests are more closely tied to debt holders than is commonly
acknowledged, and that at least in some ﬁrms, managers hold more inside debt than inside equity.
This suggests that a reappraisal of the literature may be in order. It also points to the need to
develop new theoretical frameworks that can address the possible optimality of inside debt—in
particular, pensions—in managerial compensation.4
A notable ﬁrst step in this direction is Edmans (2005). Where risk-shifting is the only concern,
Edmans shows, echoing Jensen and Meckling, that inside debt can address this problem; that
it can do so more fully than debt-covenants; and, perhaps most interestingly, that inside debt
continues to form a part of optimal compensation even in the presence of such considerations as
bonuses or private beneﬁts.5 When shirking is also a concern, the role of inside debt becomes
more intricate. On the one hand, it continues to moderate risk-shifting incentives. Inside equity
is required to improve managerial incentives to exert eﬀort, but this exacerbates risk-shifting;
inside debt works to mitigate this impact. On the other, it performs an important alignment
3Other relevant papers in this context include Zender (1991) and Aghion and Bolton (1992) who also address
the point that income streams and control rights have a speciﬁc relationship, but who do not have multiple outside
investors; and Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) who have multiple claimholders but no outside equity.
4In this context, Dybvig and Zender (1991) show that a priori restrictions on the set of compensation schemes
in a theoretical model can lead to biased results. The context of their paper is very diﬀerent from ours: their aim
is to show that allowing for information asymmetries does not overturn the Modiglian-Miller irrelevance results if
compensation mechanisms are not limited.
5Fixed bonuses and private beneﬁts are debt-like in that they involve a given payoﬀ in the event of the
ﬁrm remaining solvent; however, they are also insensitive to the value of the ﬁrm in bankruptcy, and so are
more like binary options than debt. A previous literature (e.g., John and John (1993)) had suggested that such
considerations could resolve risk-shifting problems, but Edmans notes that these results are contingent on the
special forms assumed in these papers for ﬁrm value in bankruptcy, and, indeed, that under diﬀerent assumptions,
private beneﬁts may even exacerbate risk-shifting.
6role. Inside equity aligns managers with equity holders in good states, but inside debt aligns
managers with debt holders in bad states. The latter becomes important if one assumes that
managerial eﬀort can improve not only the value of the ﬁrm when solvent, but also its liquidation
values. In particular, if bankruptcy is likely or if the marginal impact of managerial eﬀort on
liquidation values is high, managerial eﬀort may actually be improved by substituting inside debt
for inside equity. This indicates, curiously, that suboptimal managerial eﬀort may, in some cases,
be because of too much equity. More generally, it suggests that inside debt may be important in
highly levered companies where risk-shifting considerations are ﬁrst-order.
Virtually no previous empirical scholarship has studied the role of pensions in top manage-
ment compensation. When CEOs’ pensions are mentioned in academic journals, the discussion
occasionally includes references to the annual amount due to a CEO upon retirement, but almost
never to the actuarial present value of the lifetime entitlement. A recent exception is Bebchuk
and Jackson (2005), who tabulate the pension values for 51 current or recently retired CEOs
of S&P 500 companies and conclude that pensions represent a signiﬁcant component of those
CEOs’ compensation.6
An extensive literature in labor economics has dealt with workers’ pension plans (see, e.g., the
survey paper by Gustman, Mitchell, and Steinmeier (1994)), and some of the conclusions of this
research appear to have relevance for executive pensions as well. Much of the labor economics
pension literature concerns the fundamental question of why companies oﬀer pension plans at
all, particularly deﬁned beneﬁt plans. Explanations proposed in the literature have included:
• encouraging worker-ﬁrm “bonding” and reducing labor mobility by creating a high opport-
nuity cost in lost beneﬁts if the worker leaves the ﬁrm voluntarily;
• acting as an incentive mechanism for workers not to shirk, particularly near the end of a
labor contract, since having employment terminated before retirement has a substantial
cost in lost retirement pay (e.g., Lazear, 1979); and
• enabling ﬁrms to control retirement ﬂows by providing a sharp beneﬁt increase to workers
who retire around the company’s chosen retirement age (Lazear (1979, 1983)).
There are obvious analogies between these hypotheses and some of those we examine in this
paper—for example, the incentives provided by pensions to the CEO in terms of risk-taking or the
6To calculate pension values, Bebchuk and Jackson use life annuity price quotes from a commercial website
aﬃliated with Annuity Shopper magazine. For CEOs who have not yet reached retirement age, these values are
discounted back to the executive’s current age using a constant discount factor of 5%. This approach has an
important shortcoming, because it does not derive the discount factor from the credit rating of the company
granting the pension. Our computations, which utilize the credit-ratings of the ﬁrms, result in discount factors
varying in our sample from 4.92% to 15.25%.
7relation between CEO turnover and the date pensions become payable. Whether deﬁned beneﬁt
plans facilitate CEO-ﬁrm “bonding” by discouraging voluntary turnover is also one of evident
interest.7 However, there are important diﬀerences between the roles of the CEO and the workers
in a ﬁrm, so their respective pension plans may exist for separate reasons.8
Two additional branches of corporate ﬁnance research are also related to our work. One line
of relevant research concerns the“horizon problem” of CEOs approaching retirement. Evidence
indicates that these CEOs tend to reduce investment and R&D spending in their ﬁnal years in
order to maximize accounting earnings and reap larger annual cash bonuses. See Dechow and
Sloan (1991). We also predict that CEOs behave more conservatively as they grow old, but the
motivation in our paper involves not the maximization of annual bonus income, but instead the
safeguarding of the value of their pensions and deferred compensation. The means by which
CEOs do so may involve some mix of reducing investment spending, selecting less risky projects,
unlevering the ﬁrm’s capital structure, or lengthening the maturity of the ﬁrm’s debt.
A separate, rich literature has considered the role of deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans as an aspect
of corporate ﬁnance generally. Pension plans have important eﬀects upon corporate taxation,
funds available for investment, mergers and acquisitions, and especially in recent years, earnings
management. A notable recent example of this research is Rauh (2006). However, this literature
has not considered the importance of pensions in the compensation of individual managers, which
is our focus.
3 CEO Pensions
The “inside debt” compensation owed by ﬁrms to their CEOs can take the form of either pen-
sion obligations or deferred compensation. Because disclosure is extremely limited for deferred
compensation,9 we must restrict the analysis in this paper to pensions only. In the minority of
7In the labor economics literature, evidence on bonding appears mixed. Ippolito (1991) and Allen, Clark, and
McDermed (1993) ﬁnd a negative relationship between deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans and labor turnover, but
Gustman and Steinmeier (1993) ﬁnd that deﬁned contribution plans have an equally strong negative association
with labor mobility, indicating that the relationship between deﬁned beneﬁts and reduced labor mobility may not
be causal.
8For example, there is an analogy between the unsecured nature of CEO pension plans and underfunded worker
pension plans. Ippolito (1985) oﬀers the suggestion that leaving workers’ pension plans underfunded may weaken
unions’ bargaining or holdup power, but this line of reasoning would appear inapplicable to top managers.
9Nearly every company has a deferred compensation plan for its executives, but disclosure is only required
of “above-market interest” earned on the deferred compensation account balance. Above-market interest occurs
only if the company credits the executive with a ﬁxed rate of interest and this ﬁxed rate exceeds 110% of the
Internal Revenue Service “applicable federal rate” which was in eﬀect at the time of establishment of the plan.
Using this information, one can convert the amount of above-market interest paid during a year to an executive
into an average annual balance in their deferred compensation account. Most ﬁrms do not pay a ﬁxed rate of
8cases in which deferred compensation values can be inferred (less than 15 percent of the sample),
this form of inside debt is usually far less than the value of pensions, so the omission of deferred
compensation from our analysis may not be serious.
Pensions for CEOs are usually called supplemental executive retirement plans, or SERPs, since
their payouts far exceed the maximum federally-insured amounts available to most workers under
ordinary tax-qualiﬁed pension plans (CEOs usually participate in a company’s ordinary plan up
to the maximum amount, but the vast majority of their pension entitlements will be covered by
a SERP). SERP pension liabilities represent unsecured, unfunded debt held by executives against
the ﬁrm, and should the ﬁrm become insolvent, SERP pension beneﬁciaries would stand in line
with other unsecured creditors.10 A ﬁrm generally does not receive a tax deduction until pension
payments are made to a retired executive, and the executive does not face an income tax liability
until payments are received. For at least some ﬁrms, pensions therefore oﬀer the possibility for net
tax savings between the company and an executive by shifting compensation from the present
to the future, when one party or the other might expect to have diﬀerent marginal tax rates
compared to the present.
We calculate the actuarial present value of each CEO’s pension as of the end of each ﬁscal
year. The large majority of CEO pensions are deﬁned beneﬁt plans that pay a ﬁxed amount per
year upon retirement. Typically the pension is payable as a life annuity, although some companies
disclose pension values based upon diﬀerent annuity types.11 All companies specify a minimum
retirement age, which is the earliest age that an executive can leave the company and obtain
100% of the earned pension beneﬁt (most companies will pay a reduced amount in the event of
early retirement). If the CEO chooses to work beyond the minimum retirement age, he forfeits
the right to pension beneﬁts that he would otherwise have collected by retiring. The formula for
interest but instead permit deferred compensation balances to be invested in diversiﬁed index funds, bond funds,
or synthetic shares of company stock, and in these cases no disclosure of executive earnings is required.
10About 15 percent of the sample companies disclose funding executives’ pensions with so-called “rabbi”
trust funds or similar devices such as insurance policies. Rabbi trusts are irrevocable, meaning that the ﬁrm
cannot withdraw contributions once they are made, but in the event of bankruptcy these trusts can be reached
by the ﬁrm’s creditors. A separate and much rarer device, a “secular” trust fund, can be used to secure an
executive’s pension in a bankruptcy-proof form, but these trusts have adverse income tax consequences and
are extremely controversial with creditors and other employees. The CEOs of both Delta Air Lines Inc. and
AMR Corp. (the parent of American Airlines) lost their jobs in 2003-4 after disclosing that they had created
such trusts for the beneﬁt of themselves and other top managers. See Bachelder (1995 and 2003) as well as
www.401kpsp.com/rabbitrust.htm.
11Two popular alternatives are a life annuity with a guaranteed minimum term, and a joint life annuity payable
for the longer of the life of the CEO and his or her spouse. Calculations for the values of other annuities require
only straightforward modiﬁcations to equation (1). In cases of joint spousal annuities, we assume that the CEO is
married with a spouse of the same age. Many ﬁrms give executives the option of choosing among several payout
schemes, with the annual amount adjusted in an actuarially fair way so that the overall value of the pension does
not change.
9the actuarial present value of a CEO’s pension is, in most cases:
K−A 
n=max(0,R−A)
p(n)X
(1 + d)n (1)
where X is the annual pension amount, R is the minimum retirement age, A is the CEO’s current
age, p(n) is the probability that the CEO is alive n y e a r si nt h ef u t u r e ,d is the ﬁrm’s cost of
long-term debt, and K is the terminal year of the pension. The mortality probabilities by age,
p(n), are obtained separately for male and female CEOs using actuarial tables published by the
US Social Security Administration. In theory K can increase without limit, but for simplicity we
set K =1 2 0and assume that all CEOs die with certainty by age 120, so that p(120 − A)=0 ,
because the Social Security mortality tables do not extend beyond age 119.
The CEO’s current age and the company’s minimum pension retirement age are disclosed in
company proxy statements. The company’s cost of debt is based upon historical bond ratings for
most ﬁrms supplied by Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s, and historical corporate yield curves for
diﬀerent rating classes supplied by Salomon Smith Barney; we use the seven-year US Treasury
bond yield plus an appropriate markup for each rating class, because seven years approximates
the duration of cash ﬂows that most CEOs expect from their pension entitlements. When no
bond rating is available, we estimate a company’s debt rating based upon comparable companies;
a majority of the observations without bond ratings are for ﬁrms with little or no long-term debt
outstanding, and we classify most of them as Aaa credits. Within the range of diﬀerent rating
classes of investment grade debt, small changes in assumptions about discount rates do not lead
to material changes in estimated pension values.
The most diﬃcult part of the calculation arises in estimating X, the annual pension amount
that each CEO is entitled to receive upon retirement. In some cases companies disclose this
value directly, but more often it must be inferred from other information published in the proxy
statement, a process that requires time-consuming research for each company. In practice, the
annual pension entitlement is usually calculated according to the following formula:
P 
k=1
Ct−k
P
× M × S, (2)
where Ct is the cash salary and bonus compensation for year t, P is a number of past years
(usually either three or ﬁve) whose compensation is averaged together as part of the formula,
M is a multiplier factor that usually lies in a neighborhood between 0.015 and 0.020, and S is
the executive’s number of years of service. Often the formula is modiﬁed so that the product
MS is capped at a value of perhaps 0.50 or 0.60. Therefore, for many long-serving executives
10the pension payment will equal 60% of the average pay received in their ﬁnal three years in
oﬃce.12 The structure of the formula eﬀectively serves as a multiplier on the value of current
cash compensation, since a CEO who receives a pay increase will see that increase feed into the
pension formula and increase his retirement pay as well. This eﬀect intensiﬁes as the CEO gets
older, since the present value of future pension income grows larger as he nears retirement. Under
a reasonable set of assumptions,13 an extra dollar of cash compensation received in one year adds
about 48 cents to the actuarial present value of a pension when a CEO is 55 years old, and
about $1.10 when he is 65. Since this override eﬀect exerted by pension plans upon salary and
bonus income tends to strengthen as CEOs near retirement, it resembles the optimal life-cycle
compensation scheme derived by Gibbons and Murphy (1992), who argue that executives near
retirement require the strongest pay-performance incentives.
Companies are required by the Securities and Exchange Commission to disclose annual pension
payments in a matrix format, in which years of service S are tabulated on one axis, and ﬁnal
average compensation C is tabulated on the other. The pension formula itself is not directly
disclosed, but it can be inferred for any single executive by locating his position on the matrix
and comparing the values of bordering cells. Many companies reduce the pension payout by the
amount of an executive’s Social Security entitlement, but because this sum is trivial for most
CEOs (perhaps 1 to 3 percent of their pensions), we do not take account of this adjustment. In
the Appendix, we present an example of the calculations required to derive the actuarial present
value of a pension for one CEO, along with a copy of the company’s disclosure table that serves
as a basis for the derivation.
An issue arises concerning the life expectancy data used in our calculations of CEOs’ pension
values. Our mortality data from the US Social Security Administration is derived from the entire
US population, rather than just CEOs. CEOs may have longer life expectancies than ordinary
people due to their aﬄuence and access to superior health care, in which case our calculated
values of their lifetime pensions would represent under-estimates. A counter-argument is that
CEOs may face unusually high mortality risks due to the stress of their jobs, the lack of time for
exercise, the constant disruption of sleeping and eating routines due to travel, and the frequent
use of light aircraft. Indeed, the incidence of unexpected deaths of CEOs while in oﬃce has been
high enough to spawn several academic studies, beginning with Johnson, Magee, Nagarajan, and
12Equation (2) is written so that the pension payout is based on compensation received in the most recent P
years in oﬃce. Some ﬁrms instead use the highest P-year average achieved in any P consecutive years in oﬃce,
while still others use the highest any P individual years, whether consecutive or not. In practice, because cash
compensation tends to increase almost monotonically over an executive’s career, all of these formulas yield the
same value for most executives. To keep the data collection and calculations tractable for this paper, we use the
formula in equation (2) as the default for all observations unless better information is readily available.
13Assume that the number of years averaged P = 5, the multiplier M = 0.016, years service S =2 0a ta g e
55 and S = 30 at age 65, and the real discount rate d = 0.03. If we instead assume P = 3, the totals would be
80 cents and $1.84, respectively.
11Newman (1985).
No systematic data is available on the mortality rates of CEOs or top business executives, but
two forms of related data are informative: studies of the life expectancies of annuity purchasers,
and studies of life expectancies of other public ﬁgures. Our examination of these (see below)
suggests that our CEO lifetime pension value numbers would not perhaps be very diﬀerent were
better data on their life-expectancy available.
Deﬁned beneﬁt pensions are life annuities, and a number of authors have explored the value
of life annuity contracts when the population of annuitants is not randomly selected. Mitchell,
Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown (1999) study the eﬀects of adverse selection in a group of
voluntary purchasers of annuities, who exhibit lower death rates and longer life expectancies than
the general population. For males aged 55, using discount rates based on corporate bond yields,
the authors ﬁnd an 8.7 percent premium for the value of annuities issued to voluntary purchasers
compared to annuities issued to the general population. For males aged 65 the premium for
voluntary annuitants rises to 12.8 percent, and it increases further for older holders of annuities,
since the diﬀerential death rates of annuity holders compared to the general population become
more economically meaningful in old age.
Most of the CEOs in our sample lie between the ages of 55 and 65, suggesting that the
value of their pensions should be adjusted upward by perhaps 10 percent if their mortality rates
are similar to those of voluntary annuitants. However, the CEOs in our sample are not genuine
voluntary annuitants, since most participate by default in company-wide, service-based deﬁned
beneﬁt plans that predate their careers with the ﬁrm. As such, our CEOs belong to a class known
as “compulsory annuitants,” rather than voluntary annuitants. Mitchell and McCarthy (2002)
ﬁnd lower longevity diﬀerentials for compulsory annuitants compared to the general population
than for voluntary annuitants. This suggests that any adjustment to the value of CEOs’ lifetime
pensions to account for diﬀerential life expectancy might be relatively small, probably on the
order of 5 percent of pension value.
The most relevant academic study of the mortality of public ﬁgures appears in Redelmeier and
Singh (2001), who ﬁnd that Academy Award winning actors and actresses live almost four years
longer on average than a matched sample of movie performers who never win Oscars. The authors
label this longevity diﬀerential the “status eﬀect.” A similar pattern might apply to CEOs, who
by deﬁnition are more successful in their careers than most people. However, when we tried to
replicate the Redelmeier-Singh study for two other populations for which data is readily available,
we found very little to no eﬀect.14 These ﬁndings suggest that the status eﬀect for Oscar winners
14The two populations we examined were US-born Major League Baseball players and members of the US
House of Representatives. In the former case, we looked at two possible status eﬀects: whether a player had ever
been chosen to play in the annual All-Star game (about 13% of the sample of 8,567 players) or had been chosen
Most Valuable Player (less than 1% of the sample). For the Congressional group, we looked at the subgroup (644
12found by Redelmeier and Singh may be sample-speciﬁc, and that a similar eﬀect may not exist
for the population at large.
4 Descriptive Statistics
Data for our study comes from 237 ﬁrms drawn from the 2002 Fortune 500 ranking of the largest
US companies. From the initial list of 500 companies, we drop all private ﬁrms as well as those
public companies that do not have a history on the ExecuComp compensation database extending
at least ten years back to 1993. This results in a subset of 237 ﬁrms, and we retain observations
for the seven-year period 1996-2002, for a ﬁnal sample of 1,659 ﬁrm-year observations. Because
of the sample design, the data set includes some over-representation of larger ﬁrms with longer
operating histories, since ﬁrms must have qualiﬁed for the ExecuComp database continuously
since 1992. An historical sample selection rule is necessary for this research, because pension
values are calculated based upon as many as ﬁve years lagged data for past compensation, and
we reserve data for the years 1993-95 to use in these computations. In some cases, we must
retrieve company proxy statements back to 1991 from Internet sources in order to collect the
necessary compensation history for certain executives.
Due to our historical selection rule, our sample includes an over-representation of large, older
ﬁrms with successful track records of at least a decade of strong performance; the sample includes
many of the most famous names in American business, such as General Electric, Microsoft, Disney,
Coca Cola, Intel, and IBM, and the 237 ﬁrms we study have an aggregate market capitalization
of $5.4 trillion as of the end of 2002. Casual observation suggests that these older, large cap
ﬁrms are among the most likely to oﬀer pensions to their employees.
Table II presents data comparing our 237 sample ﬁrms to the 274 companies in the Standard
& Poor’s 500 index at year-end 2002 that are not part of our study (11 of our Fortune 500 sample
companies are not S&P 500 members, so Table II analyzes a total of 511 ﬁrms). Compared to
other S&P 500 ﬁrms, those in our sample are larger and older, but they have similar proﬁtability
and returns to shareholders (over a ﬁve-year horizon). Our sample ﬁrms are more likely to belong
to manufacturing industries and less likely to be technology companies. CEOs in our sample ﬁrms
out of a total sample size of 10,367) that had served in the US Senate. Even after numerous cuts of the data
related to career dates and length, we found no status eﬀect for baseball players based on either being chosen for
the All-Star game or being chosen MVP. Among the politicians, we found a slightly higher (roughly one year) life
expectancy for those Representatives who were also Senators at some point, compared to those who never were.
Even this small diﬀerence may simply reﬂect a form of survivorship bias than a status eﬀect since longevity in the
House of Representatives may provide a candidate with visibility that leads to election to the Senate. Moreover,
Representatives who move up to the Senate may have above-average ﬁnancial aﬄuence, since personal ﬁnancial
resources may be needed to win election to the Senate.
13earn higher cash salary and bonus compensation compared to those in the rest of the S&P 500,
but less compensation from stock option awards. As expected, the incidence of CEO pension
plans, which is ascertained from ExecuComp,15 is signiﬁcantly higher for our sample ﬁrms than
for other S&P 500 companies. These data suggest that our results below must be interpreted
with some care, since our research design yields a sample in which pension compensation for
CEOs is more widespread than usual.
For the 237 companies in our sample, Tables III–V and Figure 1 present information concerning
CEOs’ pensions and other aspects of their compensation. Table III shows that for most CEOs,
equity value is far higher than pension value, and the median ratio between these two quantities
is 0.07. However, as shown below, this ratio increases markedly as CEOs grow older.
To understand the importance of pension increases in yearly CEO compensation for our sample
companies, the ﬁrst step is to measure the annual increment to CEO pensions. This is the present
value of the diﬀerence between the stream of cash ﬂows to which the CEO is currently entitled
using (2) and the stream to which s/he was entitled a year ago. Conceptually, this is the inside-
debt analog of new equity grants: one could think of the corporation issuing a new bond to the
CEO each year, representing a lifetime annuity with a face value equal to this diﬀerence which is:
M
P

[Ct−1 − Ct−(P+1)]S +
P 
k=1
Ct−k

. (3)
The present value of this mean annual increment across our sample equals $1.0 million. This
sample mean value, as well as the sample mean values for subgroups of CEOs reported in Table
IV, are somewhat understated, because our calculations essentially rely on ﬁrst diﬀerences in
compensation and force us to discard the observation for each CEO’s ﬁrst year in the dataset if
he has a non-zero pension;16 this process causes a disproportionately large number of zero-valued
observations to enter the calculations.
15One variable tabulated by ExecuComp is the years service accured for pension, if any, for each CEO. This
variable has a nonzero value only if the company’s proxy statement includes the SEC’s required pension matrix
reporting the annual lifetime pension beneﬁt for an individual as a joint function of his average income and his
years of service. We create an indicator variable and set it equal to 1 if the years service for pension purposes is
nonzero. It is important to point out that this variable will understate (perhaps substantially) the true incidence
of CEO pensions, since it will not indicate pensions negotiated by contract or calculated according to a method
other than the common pay/service formula. In our sample, for instance, 13% of CEOs—a sixth of the total
number who had pension plans—had pension plans that are outside the pay/service formula (see Table V), so
were not picked up by this indicator.
16The pension increment is missing for about one-ﬁfth of the sample observations. These cases include new
CEOs hired from outside the ﬁrm, CEOs with insuﬃcient disclosed compensation histories to permit computations,
and companies using certain patterns of disclosure which do not permit us to decode the underlying pension
formula. These computational problems do not prevent us from obtaining the year-end value of each CEO’s
pension entitlement.
14A second number of interest is the annual change in the present value of total pension
entitlement, that is, the diﬀerence between the present value of pension entitlement calculated
today and the present value of pension entitlement calculated a year ago. (This is the inside-debt
analog of the change in the value of total equity held by the CEO.) This change could be negative
if the company’s cost of debt has risen over the last year, if the company has changed its pension
formula, if the pension increment this year was negative because the CEO took a cut in his cash
compensation, or if the CEO is working past the normal retirement age and has failed to draw
down his pension when it became available.
Pension values decline on an objective actuarial basis for about 6 percent of the CEO-year
observations in the sample, and a signiﬁcant number of these observations occur due to market-
wide increases in interest rates that reduce the value of all pensions across-the-board. However,
in the vast majority of cases, CEO pension values rise each year. Even if there is no change in
basic compensation, the CEO’s years of service (the variable S in equation (2)) will increase each
year, his life expectancy will increase so long as he has not died, and the discounted value of
future pension entitlements will increase as well. As shown in Table III, the mean overall change
in a CEO’s pension value is also about $1.0 million each year.
CEO pension values are highly sensitive to age. Figure 1 illustrates mean and median actuarial
pension values for all CEOs in the sample between ages 51 and 65. As shown on the graph, the
mean lifetime pension entitlement has a present value of just $1.5 million for 51-year-old CEOs,
but this rises to more than $10 million at age 65; the median values increase from $0.9 million
to $6.4 million over the same range. The convex shape of the top graph shows that the rate
of pension growth accelerates as CEOs age. Data on the graph are likely subject to some self-
selection bias, as those CEOs with the most valuable pensions may be inclined to retire earlier
and drop out of the sample.
Table IV shows mean values for all sources of CEO compensation, including the annual
increment to pension value, for the entire sample and for subsamples of CEOs arranged according
to age. The sum of total compensation from all categories is almost invariant to age, averaging
right around $10 million per CEO per year, but the importance of pension value as part of
overall compensation change increases monotonically up to age 65. For CEOs in the age 46-50
group, the annual pension increment averages $400,000, representing about 4 percent of total
compensation. In the age 61-65 group, in contrast, the average pension increase is $1.6 million
annually, representing about 15 percent of total compensation. Beyond age 65, pensions begin
to lose their importance; many members of this group are sacriﬁcing the right to draw down
their pensions by continuing to work, which makes the net change in pension value lower than for
those younger than 65. One can also assume that many CEOs with the most lucrative pensions
retire by age 65 and exit the sample.
Data near the bottom of Table IV shows the ratio between pension value and equity value
15for CEOs in diﬀerent age groups. The data indicate that this ratio also increases monotonically,
rising from about 0.05 for CEOs in the 46-50 year-old age bracket to 0.27 for CEOs aged 61-65,
until it too falls oﬀ for CEOs aged 66 and above. In other words, pension values tend to rise more
rapidly than the value of equity owned as CEOs grow older, giving managers increasing incentives
to run the ﬁrm more in the interests of debtholders and less in the interests of equityholders.
The last line of the table shows the fraction of CEOs for whom the personal debt/equity ratio
(pension value divided by share plus option value) exceeds the ﬁrm’s overall debt/equity ratio
(short- and long-term debt divided by the market value of equity). This group of CEOs will have
clear incentives to pursue policies that favor debt more than equity. Thirteen percent of all CEOs
fall into this group, with the fraction again rising monotonically by age.17
We ﬁnd that a signiﬁcant amount of variation exists both between ﬁrms and within ﬁrms in
the design of pension plans. Sixty seven ﬁrms, or 28 perecent of those in the sample, change
either the form of their pension plan or the underlying formula at some point during the seven-year
sample period, not counting several dozen ﬁrms that negotiate one-time pension enhancements
with CEOs in their ﬁnal year of service (see Yermack (2006)).
Table V presents detail about the frequency and structure of CEO pensions within the sample.
Pensions are held by CEOs in all but 22 percent of the ﬁrm-year observations, and the majority
of these pensions are awarded based on the age/service formula used in equation (2) above. A
minority of CEOs negotiate their pensions directly as part of their employment contracts,18 or
participate in cash balance pension plans which are generally quite modest in value. A large
overlap occurs between whether a ﬁrm awards pensions to its CEO, and the presence of a deﬁned
beneﬁt pension plan for other workers in the ﬁrm, according to Compustat’s disclosure of whether
the ﬁrm has nonzero assets held in a deﬁned beneﬁt plan,19 but the overlap is not complete: about
10% of ﬁrms with deﬁned beneﬁt workforce pensions do not award pensions to their CEOs, and
17Our calculations here are conservative. We have taken no account of deferred compensation as part of the
CEO’s inside debt holdings. In addition, one could argue that the CEO’s ﬁxed salary represents a form of pseudo-
debt that the executive expects to collect up until retirement age, and taking account of that claim would increase
the CEO’s debt/equity ratio further. Also, the ﬁrm’s debt/equity ratio would decrease if one counted convertible
debt as part of equity capital instead of debt capital.
18The table indicates that 6 percent of CEOs negotiate ﬁxed pension amounts in their employment contracts.
However, a larger number negotiate modiﬁcations to the pay/service formula to make it more generous for
themselves than the formula used for regular company employees. For example, while serving as the CEO of CSX
Corp., John W. Snow had an employment contract calling for his pension to be calculated including the value of
restricted stock grants as part of his annual income, an enhancement of the company’s ordinary formula that took
account of only salary and bonus; while serving as the CEO of Alcoa Inc., Paul H. O’Neill had an employment
contract that awarded him two years of service time for pension purposes for every one year worked.
19These data for workforce pension plans are somewhat misleading, for two reaons. Some of the ﬁrms with
assets held in deﬁned beneﬁt plans may have discontinued their plans for current or future workers. In addition,
some ﬁrms may provide workforce pensions based upon a deﬁned contribution or cash balance formula, instead
of the more traditional deﬁned beneﬁt structure.
16about 20% of ﬁrms no workforce deﬁned beneﬁt plan do provide for CEO pensions. Within
the subsample of CEOs that receive pensions, the retirement age at which full pension beneﬁts
become available is usually 65, though a minority of ﬁrms pay full pensions at earlier ages, some
as young as age 55. Most CEO pensions are based upon ﬁnal average compensation which always
includes salary and also includes bonuses 94 percent of the time. A small minority of ﬁrms take
into account other forms of compensation, such as restricted stock awards or long-term incentive
plans, when making these calculations. Final average compensation is nearly always based upon
either three years pay (39 percent of all observations), or ﬁve years pay (54 percent).
Data in Tables III-V indicate that pensions are an important part of overall CEO compensation
in our sample ﬁrms. No broad-based data about the size and frequency of CEO pension plans
is available for other ﬁrms throughout the economy. However, we are able to obtain some
information about the broad-based distribution of CEO pensions from ExecuComp. As discussed
above, we assume that when ExecuComp reports a nonzero value for a CEO’s years service
for pension purposes, the company must be maintaining a SERP and reporting it in the proxy
statement. For the entire ExecuComp sample, we construct a binary variable for pay/service
CEO pensions and code it 1 if the CEO has positive years of service for pension purposes, and
0 otherwise. For 2003, the most recent ExecuComp year with complete data, the incidence of
deﬁned beneﬁt pensions according to this method is 24.0% in the Standard and Poor’s index of
600 small capitalization ﬁrms, 32.7% in its index of 400 mid cap ﬁrms, and 52.0% in the S&P 500
Index of large cap ﬁrms.20 As shown by data in Table V, the incidence of pay/service pensions
for CEOs in our sample was somewhat higher at 65% for the entire 1996-2002 period, and it was
61% for the subsample of 2002 observations.
Despite the evident importance of CEO pensions as part of overall compensation, especially
in large capitalization companies, current SEC regulations require only complex and somewhat
opaque disclosures about pensions, and ﬁnancial acumen is required to convert the reported
data into estimates of the fair value of any executive’s pension. Disclosure practices in certain
other countries such as the U.K. provide far more illuminating reports of pension values and their
annual changes. Moreover, disclosure requirements are non-existent in the US for most aspects
of deferred compensation, as well as post-retirement transactions involving pension rights such as
“SERP swaps” that are understood to be available to many top executives but never disclosed.
20We compared the true incidence of pay/service CEO pensions in our sample with the frequency estimated
by this ExecuComp variable and found that the overall totals were quite close, although the ExecuComp variable
suﬀered from modest coding errors, in which the false positive observations were netted out almost exactly by a
similar number of false negatives.
175 Cross-Sectional Determinants of CEO Debt vs Equity
Holdings
We analyze the distribution of CEOs’ inside debt and equity ownership within our sample of 237
ﬁrms. We measure inside debt value as the actuarial present value of CEO pension holdings
and equity value as the market value of stock and stock options, with option portfolios valued
according to standard Black-Scholes assumptions.21 As discussed above, the absence of deferred
compensation from our analysis will lead to estimates of CEO debt values somewhat below the
true level. Since we are assessing the relative strength of debt and equity ownership for our
sample CEOs, the key dependent variable in our regression analysis equals the ratio of pension
(or debt) value divided by stock plus option (or equity) value.
We test several well-known theories of compensation that appear in the literature on eq-
uity incentives (Yermack, 1995), in tandem with theories of debt-based compensation that are
discussed above. These include:
• Leverage: Because debt-based compensation reduces the agency costs of debt, we should
observe a positive association between the CEO’s debt/equity ratio and the ﬁrm’s leverage
(see Edmans (2005) for a theoretical framework making this point). We measure leverage
as long-term debt over the sum of long-term debt and stockholders’ equity, as reported
by Compustat. We use the book value instead of the market value of equity to avoid
a mechanical negative association between the leverage variable and the market value of
CEOs’ equity holdings.
• Liquidity: Equity compensation provides a means for ﬁrms to pay executives without the use
of cash. (Pension compensation too does not require immediate cash, but will require the
use of cash at some point.) We therefore expect a negative association between measures of
liquidity and CEOs’ debt/equity ratios. We measure liquidity constraints with an indicator
variable that equals 1 if the ﬁrm has negative operating cash ﬂow.
• Growth opportunities: Equity pay is expected to be used when a ﬁrm has many valu-
able investment opportunities that are best understood by managers instead of outside
21We obtain information about the number of options held and their average exercise prices from ExecuComp.
We then estimate option portfolio values by applying a “representative option” approach that has become widely
used in the compensation literature. Core and Guay (2002) provide empirical validation of this approach. We
assume all outstanding options have six-year lives and use the prevailing ﬁrm volatilities, dividend rates, and
risk free rates to value them on a Black-Scholes basis. If all of a CEO’s outstanding options are out-of-the-
money, we cannot calculate an average exercise price for the representative option. In these cases we read older
proxy statements until we can obtain enough information about the options’ exercise prices in order to use the
representative option method.
18shareholders or directors. We therefore expect a negative association between measures of
growth opportunities and the CEO’s debt/equity ratio. We use the ratio of research and
development expense over sales as a proxy for growth opportunities. We avoid other mea-
sures that rely on the company’s stock price, such as the market-to-book ratio or Tobin’s
Q, because these will exhibit mechanical positive correlations with the value of the CEO’s
equity holdings.
• Tax status: Taxation plays a role in both stock option and pension compensation. Each
provides opportunities for income deferral to future years, which could result in a net tax
savings for the ﬁrm and executive depending on the marginal tax rates of each. Stock
options have additional favorable tax treatment under certain conditions, although CEO
stock option awards are generally too large to qualify for these beneﬁts. We include as a
regression control an indicator variable for whether the ﬁrm has net operating loss carry-
forwards on its balance sheet as a proxy for its tax status. However, we cannot make an
unambiguous prediction about the sign of the estimate for this variable, since compensation
in both the numerator and denominator of the CEO’s debt/equity ratio delivers certain types
of tax beneﬁts.
We estimate our regressions in a Tobit framework due to the signiﬁcant number of zero-
valued observations for the CEO pension variable. All regressions include control variables for
the ﬁrm size (the log of total assets) and a range of governance variables including the log of
board size, the percentage of outside directors on the board, the CEO’s years tenure in oﬃce, a
dummy for whether the CEO belongs to the ﬁrm’s founding family, and the percentage ownership
by institutional investors as reported by Thomson/CDA. Most importantly, we control for CEO
years of service, because the formula for the accumulation of pension value will mechanically
increase a CEO’s debt incentives based upon his years with the ﬁrm, as discussed above. We
also include a dummy variable for CEOs who are hired from outside the ﬁrm. Casual observation
suggests to us that these CEOs are likelier to negotiate employment contracts with special pension
provisions. This could occur for at least two reasons. First, the ﬁrm may have to make the CEO
whole if he sacriﬁced unvested pension beneﬁts at his previous employer when he changed jobs.
Second, as noted above, pension compensation can have the eﬀect of bonding a worker to the
ﬁrm, and companies may feel more of a need for a bonding mechanism when a complete outsider,
who has already changed companies at least once, is brought in as CEO.
Table VI presents the regression estimates, with some of the control variables untabulated in
order to save space. In the left column estimates are based upon the value of the CEO’s pension
alone; these estimates are shown so that the reader can assess whether the results for the CEO’s
debt/equity ratio, shown in the right column, are inﬂuenced by its numerator or denominator. In
the center column we show estimates for the CEO pension value divided by the magnitude of the
CEO’s cash salary and bonus, again for comparison purposes. Because we have a seven-year panel
19and expect persistence in the pension variable’s value from year to year, we cluster the standard
errors by ﬁrm (Petersen, 2005). As shown in Table VI, the sign and signiﬁcance of coeﬃcients
for the explanatory variables is extremely similar across all three dependent variables, with the
exception of the ﬁrm size variable. Larger ﬁrms pay more pension compensation, as shown by
the positive coeﬃcient in the left column, but they do not exhibit signiﬁcantly diﬀerent mixes of
pension vs. cash compensation or pension vs. equity pay, as shown by the insigniﬁcant estimates
in the other two columns.
The ﬁrm’s leverage ratio, the key explanatory variable in the model, has a positive and
signiﬁcant association with the CEO’s pension value, whether measured in isolation or scaled by
cash compensation or equity ownership. These estimates are consistent with ﬁrms using inside
debt compensation to mitigate the agency costs of debt.
Among other control variables, the CEO’s years employed by the ﬁrm exhibits a positive
association as expected with the CEO’s pension value, although interpretation of the direction
of causation in this association is somewhat diﬃcult since pensions are structured to encourage
executives to stay with the ﬁrm. CEOs hired from outside the ﬁrm appear to have larger pensions
than CEOs promoted internally, and each of these results is signiﬁcant in all three models. Older
ﬁrms also pay larger pensions than younger ﬁrms, holding all else constant. We do not obtain
signiﬁcant estimates for the variables measuring liquidity, growth opportunities, or tax status,
though none has an unexpected sign.
6 Pensions and CEO turnover
A substantial literature has examined the determinants of executive turnover, but none with
reference to pension payout patterns. Inside debt compensation such as pensions oﬀers incentives
for the CEO to leave his position once the debt becomes payable, since ordinarily the debt
is collectible only after the CEO retires or passes age 70.5. We therefore study the interaction
between pension compensation and patterns of CEO turnover, using logistic regressions presented
in Table VII.
The dependent variable in Table VII equals 1 if the CEO leaves his position in the last half
of the current ﬁscal year or in the ﬁrst half of the subsequent ﬁscal year. We separate the cases
of CEO turnover into forced and planned, based upon searches of news stories and disclosures in
company proxy statements; about one-quarter of the turnover events are involuntary according
to our research. We omit several dozen observations involving unusual cases of CEO turnover,
including those negotiated in connection with acquisitions or spinoﬀs, acting CEOs, and cases in
which the CEO cedes the CEO title to someone else but does not retire or begin to transition
out of top management, remaining as the full-time, permanent Chairman of the Board with
20compensation equal to or exceeding the CEO (Bill Gates of Microsoft would be a representative
example).
The ﬁrst three columns of Table VII present logit estimates with the dependent variable equal
to 1 for all turnover, forced turnover only, and planned turnover only, from left to right. For our
purposes, the key explanatory variables in Table VII are two indicator variables for whether the
CEO’s pension is currently payable. The ﬁrst variable, labeled ”pension start age indicator,” equals
1 if the CEO’s age, as disclosed in the annual proxy statement, is within one year of the age at
which he has the right to payout of 100% of his earned pension beneﬁts, if any (many ﬁrms permit
CEOs to retire but collect reduced pension beneﬁts before this age). The second variable, labeled
”pension past payable indicator,” equals 1 if the CEO’s full pension start date has already passed
by one year or more. Both variables equal zero if the CEO’s right to receive his full pension has
not yet vested or if the CEO has no pension. Other explanatory variables in the regressions include
the range of controls found in many studies of CEO turnover: company performance, measured
as net-of-market stock return for the current and prior year; CEO variables, including age, percent
ownership, tenure in oﬃce, and membership in the company’s founding family; leverage; market-
to-book ratio; and governance variables including the log of board size, the percent of outside
directors on the board, and the percentage ownership by institutional investors. All regression
estimates include standard errors robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.
Estimates in Table VII show that the existence of a currently payable pension is associated
with a signiﬁcant increase in the incidence of CEO turnover, after holding constant CEO age and
other factors. The economic magnitude of the estimates is substantial; the logit marginal eﬀect
for the pension start age indicator implies that when this variable equals 1, CEO turnover rises by
4.0 percentage points, a very large magnitude compared to the unconditional voluntary turnover
rate of 7.7%. The estimated marginal eﬀect for the pension past payable indicator is even larger,
at 5.1 percentage points.
Both the pension start age and pension past payable indicators have signiﬁcant estimates
only in the models for all turnover and for voluntary turnover, and not for forced turnover. This
pattern of estimates makes intuitive sense, since the CEO controls his departure decision only in
voluntary turnover cases, and the payout status of his pension should not be expected to inﬂuence
the board’s decision about whether to dismiss an underperforming CEO.
Annual turnover frequencies plotted in Figure 2 reinforce the economic signiﬁcance of Table
VII’s regression estimates. The ﬁgure shows voluntary turnover frequencies by age for CEOs
who are at or beyond the age at which their pensions are 100% payable, compared to turnover
frequencies for CEOs who are younger than the full pension age. The graph excludes CEOs
who do not have pensions and also omits cases of forced CEO turnover. Large disparities exist in
turnover rates for CEOs of the same age, according to whether or not their pensions have become
fully payable; for example, for the group of 63-year-old CEOs, the voluntary turnover rate is 17
21percent in companies whose pensions are not yet payable in full, while the rate increases to 50
percent in ﬁrms where the pension payable age equals the CEO’s current age, and lies in between
these two numbers, at 31 percent, for CEOs who are already beyond their ﬁrm’s pension payout
age. This pattern of turnover rates holds at all CEO ages except 62, even as turnover rates
increase with age in all three categories for the age range shown on the graph.
A concern arises in interpreting the results in Table VII due to the possibility that mandatory
retirement policies in some ﬁrms may be synchronized with pension payout ages, creating illusory
causation between CEOs’ pension payout and retirement dates. The US Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, as amended in 1986, prohibits mandatory retirement for most US workers, but
an exception exists for ”high policymaker” executives such as CEOs and their management teams.
Top managers can be required by their ﬁrms to retire at a certain date, but no earlier than age
65. Notwithstanding the potential importance of mandatory retirement policies, the diﬀerential
retirement rates shown in Figure 2 for CEOs between the ages of 60 and 64 provide evidence
of the importance of pension payouts in inﬂuencing retirements, since all of these CEOs are too
young to be subject to mandatory retirement. In addition, those ﬁrms that do have mandatory
retirement policies are permitted to waive them and sometimes do for strong performing CEOs
(two recent examples occurred at ExxonMobil for Lee Raymond and General Electric for Jack
Welch).
Ideally we would like to test directly for the strength of manadatory retirement eﬀects by
compiling data about the policies of our sample ﬁrms. However, to our knowledge such policies
are not disclosed in a formal or systematic way. As an alternative, we focus on the importance of
age 65 as a retirement point for many CEOs, conjecturing that if mandatory retirement policies
are in eﬀect, the large majority of them probably occur at this age due to the controlling law. We
estimate a logit regression of planned turnover in which the two indicator variables for pension
payability are interacted with indicators based upon the CEO’s age. As shown in the rightmost
column of Table VII, we interact the pension start age indicator with a dummy variable that
equals 1 if the company’s pension start year is age 65. We also interact the pension past payable
indicator with a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO’s current age is 64, 65 or 66. Both
interaction terms have powerful eﬀects upon the estimates, consistent with mandatory retirement
policies inﬂuencing CEO turnover. Almost the entire impact of the pension start age indicator
occurs at companies with payout ages equal to 65, but the pension past payable indicator has
positive size and statistical signiﬁcance regardless of whether the CEO is near age 65. This
enables us to conclude that certain CEOs age 64 or younger retire due to the availability of their
full pensions; regressions using alternative speciﬁcations of the interaction terms (not tabulated
to save space) give further support to this conclusion. This pattern of CEO retirements due
to pension availability appears consistent with Lazear’s (1979, 1983) conjecture about ordinary
workforce pension plans, in which the payout is structured in a way to elicit voluntary retirement
of workers at certain ages.
22In further analysis, we study whether ﬁrms adjust the compensation of CEOs who do not
retire and claim their lifetime pensions in the ﬁrst possible year. We estimate a regression with
the dependent variable equal to the annual salary plus bonus cash compensation of each CEO.
The key explanatory variable equals the pension payments, if any, that certain CEOs forego
when they continue in oﬃce past the age at which full pension beneﬁts would be available for
payout. This variable equals zero for all CEOs who are below the pension payout age or who
work for companies with no pensions. Control variables in the regression include the excess stock
return for the current and prior year, ﬁrm size, and CEO characteristics including age, percentage
ownership, years tenure in oﬃce, founding family membership, and ﬁxed eﬀects for each unique
CEO-company pair. Regression estimates, which are untabulated to save space, indicate that
CEOs receive close to 50 cents on the dollar in immediate compensation for foregone pension
beneﬁts. In addition, this incremental compensation will feed into the calculation of the CEO’s
future pension beneﬁts when he ultimately retires. According to the multiplier estimates discussed
in Section 3 above, the net increase in the CEO’s wealth will be quite close to one dollar for each
dollar of foregone pension income, almost exactly compensating him for the opportunity cost of
not drawing his pension earlier.
We conclude that CEO pension plans, when present, inﬂuence CEO succession in important
ways, and we close this section with two related conjectures. First, we would expect the pension
holdings of a retiring CEO to play a role in the choice of his successor. An exiting CEO with a
large pension that is scheduled to be paid out over many years would prefer that his successor
avoid risk, limit payouts to investors, and otherwise manage the ﬁrm conservatively. We therefore
would expect these CEOs to be succeeded by older executives, from inside the ﬁrm, perhaps with
signiﬁcant pension entitlements of their own.22 Second, we observed earlier in the paper that
CEO pension values sometimes fall, for instance in cases in which current-year salary and bonus
compensation drops below the level of the past three or ﬁve years (depending on the ﬁrm’s
pension formula). Boards of directors are notoriously reluctant to dismiss mediocre CEOs except
in cases of exceedingly poor performance (see, e.g., Warner, Watts and Wruck, 1988). However,
one way for the board to induce the retirement of an under-performing CEO would be to cut his
current-year compensation. Faced with a pay cut, the CEO would have to retire immediately to
keep the value of his pension from falling.
22This prediction would not necessarily hold if CEOs can obtain lump-sum distirbutions of their pensions values
after retirement, as permitted by some companies (although sometimes only with discounts to the fair actuarial
value). We thank Kevin Murphy for this observation.
237 Inside Debt and Risk Reduction
When top executives receive part of their compensation in debt and part in equity, we would
expect them to manage the ﬁrm in a way that considers the interests of both debt and equity
investors. Classic agency cost of debt problems related to risk-shifting and excessive payouts
should diminish in importance when managers hold large pensions or deferred compensation.
We use the simple framework of Merton (1974) to clarify our hypotheses in this context.
Consider a ﬁrm with two securities outstanding: zero-coupon debt with face value F and maturity
T, and equity. If the value VT of the ﬁrm’s assets on date T exceeds F, the debt is paid oﬀ
and the balance goes to the ﬁrm’s equity holders. If VT <F , the ﬁrm is liquidated. Assume
liquidation is costless and absolute priority holds. Then the payoﬀs to debt and equity holders on
date T are, respectively:
min(VT,F) and max(VT − F,0). (4)
Now suppose the ﬁrm’s manager holds a fraction α of the ﬁrm’s equity and a fraction β of
its debt. The time T payoﬀs to the manager are:
α max(VT − F,0) + β min(VT,F). (5)
The value of the manager’s portfolio and its sensitivity to various parameters can now be deter-
mined using standard option pricing theory. If C(F) is the current value of a call option on the
ﬁ r mw i t hs t r i k ep r i c eF, the current value of the manager’s portfolio is:
αC(F)+β (V − C(F)) = βV +( α − β)C(F). (6)
The most obvious parameter of interest is risk, which enters the option pricing formula in the
form of volatility. In the oft-analyzed case in which a manager holds equity, he has an incentive to
increase the ﬁrm’s risk beyond the level desired by debtholders. In our setting, since the manager
holds both debt and equity, this incentive for risk-shifting is lessened; with enough inside debt
compensation, the manager may even have an incentive to reduce volatility. From (6), the impact
of a change in volatility on the value of the manager’s portfolio is just:
(α − β) × Vega(C(F)) (7)
This is positive if α>β , zero if α = β, and negative if α<β . In other words, if the debt-equity
ratio of the manager’s holdings is less than the ﬁrm’s debt-equity ratio, the manager has an
incentive to increase risk, and vice versa.
24To test whether managers’ inside debt holdings in the form of pensions have an impact upon
the ﬁrm’s riskiness, we utilize the concept of the “distance to default” statistic popularized by
Moody’s KMV and now widely-accepted as a qualitatively reliable indicator of default likelihood.
The distance-to-default (henceforth, DtD) is the number of standard deviations of decline in
a ﬁrm’s asset value that would push it into default. KMV’s operationalization of this notion
requires converting a ﬁrm’s debt structure into an “equivalent” zero-coupon form. Following
their approach (see Crouhy, Mark, and Galai (2001) or Sundaram (2001)), we deﬁne the default
point DPT to be equal to the sum of the face value of short-term debt (less than one year) plus
half the face value of long-term debt (greater than one year)23 and to have a maturity of one
year. This simple approximation has been found to work well in practice. With this, the distance
to default statistic is
DtD =
V − DPT
σV
(8)
Here, V is the ﬁrm’s asset market value, as above, and σ is the ﬁrm’s asset value volatility.
To estimate this, we must obtain values for the unobserved variables V and σ. We can do this
as follows. Under the default point DPT, equity holders have a call option to buy the ﬁrm for
DPT in one year’s time. The value of this call—which depends on V and σ—is the value of
equity which is observable. Since we have two unknowns, we need a second equation. For this,
we use equity volatility σE which too is observed. Standard stochastic calculus arguments show
that equity volatility and ﬁrm value and volatility are related via
σE = σ
V
E
∆E (9)
where E is the market value of equity and ∆E is the derivative ∂E/∂V of the option value
function with respect to ﬁrm value (i.e., it is the delta of the call option that equityholders own).
Using these two equations and information regarding the risk-free rate, we can now solve for V
and σ for each ﬁrm-year observation and substitute those values into (8) to obtain the estimated
distance to default. We do these DtD calculations using an iterative spreadsheet algorithm. We
discard observations for which DPT/V < 0.01, assuming that ﬁrms with a trivial amount of debt
would never default. This exclusion removes 81 ﬁrm-years, or about 5 percent of the sample.
Descriptive statistics for the distance to default statistic appear in Table III. The mean and median
distance to default are about three standard deviations of annual performance.
Table VIII presents our regression analysis of the distance to default, using ﬁxed eﬀects panel
data models with a separate intercept assigned to each unique CEO-company pair. In addition to
23We do not distinguish between bank debt and public debt, though the latter is arguably more likely to default
due to diﬃculties of renegotiation.
25variables related to CEO incentives, we control for several ﬁrm variables that should have obvious
relations to the likelihood of default: ﬁrm size (the log of total assets), leverage (in a book value
form), and diversiﬁcation (the number of segments for which the ﬁrm reports line-of-business
data). We also include a variety of other governance and ﬁnancial controls listed in the table.
Our key explanatory variables are (i) the ratio of the CEO’s pension value divided by the value
of his stock plus options equity holdings, and (ii) an indicator that takes the value of 1 if the
CEO’s personal debt/equity ratio exceeds the ﬁrm’s debt/equity ratio, calculated based upon the
market value of equity. Under this condition the CEO will have incentives to manage the ﬁrm in
ways that increase debt value relative to equity value.
Coeﬃcient estimates in Table VIII are positive and signiﬁcant for both speciﬁcations of the
CEO’s debt/equity ratio when either variable is used without the other. A unit increase in this
ratio implies an increase in distance to default close to 0.14 standard deviations, according to
the estimate in the left column. The center column’s estimates indicate that distance to default
is approximately 0.4 standard deviations higher when the CEO’s debt/equity ratio exceeds the
company’s overall ratio, which occurs for about 13 percent of the observations in the data
according to summary statistics in Table IV. The regression estimate therefore implies that these
CEOs take actions, such as accepting fewer risky investments, that reduce the likelihood of
default and the risks to their own pension values. When both variables for the CEO’s debt/equity
ratio are included in the regression together, as shown in the right column, the estimate for the
continuous variable becomes insigniﬁcant while the estimate for the indicator variable retains
almost the same size and signiﬁcance as when it is used in the model alone.
We ﬁnd that ﬁrm size exhibits a positive association with distance to default and leverage
has a negative association, both as expected, while the variable measuring diversiﬁcation has
estimates close to zero.
8 Conclusions
In a sample of large U.S. ﬁrms we ﬁnd that top managers receive signiﬁcant compensation from
“inside debt,” or intra-corporate IOUs such as pensions and deferred compensation. These com-
pensation instruments have received very little attention in prior theoretical or empirical research
into executive compensation. Debt-based compensation provides managers with interesting in-
centives to reduce the agency costs of debt. Managers holding large pensions, for example, should
be expected to pursue strategies that reduce overall ﬁrm risk. These may include choosing fewer
risky investment projects, unlevering the capital structure, reducing payouts to equity holders, or
lengthening the average maturity of outstanding debt.
We study a sample of 237 large capitalization ﬁrms and ﬁnd that CEOs hold a portfolio of
26incentives arising from both inside debt and inside equity compensation. This portfolio tends
to shift in favor of the inside debt instruments as CEOs grow older. When a CEO’s personal
debt/equity ratio exceeds the ﬁrm’s external debt/equity ratio, regression evidence indicates that
CEOs manage more conservatively to reduce the probability of a debt default.
Inside debt in the form of pensions also exerts strong inﬂuence on patterns of CEO turnover
and other types of compensation. We ﬁnd that, at any given age, the probability of a CEO
retiring voluntarily is far higher if the CEO’s pension has vested and is payable immediately. For
CEOs who continue to work beyond the minimum retirement age, cash compensation is markedly
higher, apparently to compensate them for foregone pension income.
We believe that the study of debt-based incentives for top managers can become a fruitful area
for further research. A top priority would appear to be the development of theory that illustrates
conditions under which debt-based compensation (and, in particular, pensions) represent the
solution to an optimal contracting problem; Edmans (2005) is a useful ﬁrst step in this direction.
On the empirical side, further research should be possible into how debt-based pay aﬀects the
selection of investment projects and capital structure, as well as related areas such as security
issuance decisions, mergers and acquisitions, recapitalizations, or the timing of bankruptcy ﬁlings.
Do managers with large pensions prefer to issue equity rather than debt? Will they be more
likely to exercise call provisions to force reﬁnancing or conversion of outstanding debt? If they do
borrow, will they more likely raise funds from a bank or the public markets? Do they favor a longer
maturity structure? Do managers with large amounts of inside debt seek out diversifying mergers
that reduce ﬁrm risk? Are they more or less likely to accept outside acquisition proposals, and does
this decision depend on the capital structure of the bidding ﬁrm or the method of payment oﬀered?
If the CEO has earned a large pension, is a workout to avoid bankruptcy more likely to succeed if
the ﬁrm becomes distressed? How will equity holders fare in such as transaction? Opportunities
also exist to study the structure of individual companies’ pension and deferred compensation
arrangements. Why do some ﬁrms have more generous pension formulas than others? Why do
some use three instead of ﬁve years of compensation in the calculation the pension payout? Why
do minimum retirement ages vary between 55 and 65 for diﬀerent ﬁrms? Do we observe pension
plans inﬂuencing decisions about CEO succession, especially in cases in which the exiting CEO
has a large pension to protect? With respect to deferred compensation, how much pay do ﬁrms
allow their executives to defer, and how do executives respond to these opportunities? How do
they choose to invest their deferred sums? Historical research into executive compensation would
also proﬁt from greater attention to the role of inside debt. Investigators such as Jensen and
Murphy (1990) have argued that weak pay-performance incentives through much of the 20th
century gave managers little reason to maximize equity value. Such arguments would become
stronger if augmented with data showing that managers in the 1980s, 1970s, and earlier typically
had much more invested in inside debt via pension rights than in equity via stock or options,
which we believe may well be the case.
27We also believe our research highlights the potential importance of improved public disclosure
of both pension and deferred compensation schemes. Current SEC regulations require only
complex and somewhat opaque disclosures about pensions, and ﬁnancial acumen is required to
convert the reported data into estimates of the fair value of any executive’s pension. Disclosure
practices in certain other countries such as the U.K. provide far more illuminating reports of
pension values and their annual changes. In addition, disclosure requirements are non-existent
in the US for most aspects of deferred compensation, as well as post-retirement transactions
involving pension rights such as “SERP swaps” that are understood to be available to many top
executives but never disclosed.
28A Derivation of a CEO’s Pension Value
This appendix illustrates the data collection and calculation steps for deriving the actuarial present
value of a CEO’s lifetime pension entitlement. As a representative example we use Jeﬀrey Immelt,
CEO of General Electric Co., and we calculate the value of his pension as of the end of 2004.
Table A1 reproduces the pension information disclosed in the company’s proxy statement
ﬁled early in 2005; these disclosures provide most of the information needed for the pension value
calculation. Adhering to the SEC’s disclosure guidelines, the company reports in matrix form
the ﬁxed annual lifetime pension payout that an executive would receive, as a function of his
years of service at retirement, tabulated in ﬁve-year increments along the horizontal axis, and
his earnings credited for retirement beneﬁts, tabulated in $500,000 increments along the vertical
axis. A footnote to the table indicates that Immelt has accrued 22 years service, and his earnings
credited for retirement equal the average salary and bonus earned in the highest consecutive
three-year period during his most recent ten years of employment. We assume that Immelt’s
most recent three years represent his highest consecutive three years of compensation, which
must certainly be true since he had not served as CEO prior to late 2001. From the summary
compensation table earlier in the proxy statement (not reproduced to save space), we calculate
that Immelt’s earnings credited for retirement equal $7.5 million, the average salary and bonus
he received over the three-year period of 2002 through 2004.
To infer the formula for calculating Immelt’s annual lifetime pension beneﬁt, we use simple
algebra to study relationships between the cells of the matrix bordering Immelt’s age and com-
pensation. This area is shaded grey in Table A1. It is apparent from the cells along this border
that M = 0.0175 for equation (2), which is given in the text of the main body of the paper.24
We already know that S =2 2a n dP = 3, and we have obtained Ct−k for k=1, 2, and 3 from
the summary compensation table. This information allows us to calculate the lifetime pension
entitlement as X = $2.9 million, to be used in equation (1), which is also introduced in the text
above and gives the actuarial present value of the lifetime pension entitlement.25
Other information required for equation 1 includes A, Immelt’s current age; R, the company’s
retirement age at which full pension payouts begin; d, the company’s cost of long-term debt,
and p(n), the probabilities that Immelt will be alive and continuing to receive payouts at various
ages n years into the future. The table gives R = 60, and from Immelt’s biography earlier in the
proxy statement we obtain A = 49. We make the conservative assumption that the executive
24A $1,000.00 increase in earnings credited for retirement equates to a $350.00 increase in the pension beneﬁt
for an executive with 20 years service and a $437.50 increase in the pension beneﬁt for an executive with 25 years
service; $350 / 20 = $437.50 / 25 = 0.0175.
25Close examination of the matrix in Table A1 indicates that equation (2) for Immelt should also include a ﬁxed
sum of about $12,000 per year, which appears to represent an expected Social Security entitlement. We ignore
this sum.
29works for the entire year in which he reaches retirement age, so that Immelt’s ﬁrst payment would
be received at age 61. Estimates of the company’s bond rating and associated cost of debt are
available from a variety of outside sources; we know that General Electric is a Aaa-rated company,
and for this example we use the yield to maturity on Moody’s Aaa index of long-term corporate
bonds for December 2004, as reported in Federal Reserve Statistical Release H15, which gives d
= 0.0547. A footnote at the end of the table indicates that the annual retirement beneﬁt is paid
in the form of a life annuity with a ﬁve-year certains term (executives can often elect diﬀerent
annuity payouts or even a lump-sum distribution). We therefore have p( 1 2 )=...=p(16) =
1.00. For ages 66 and above, we infer p(n) using mortality tables available from the US Social
Security Administration.26 These calculations indicate that Immelt has an 83.0 percent chance
of being alive at age 66, 81.2 percent chance of being alive at age 67, and so forth; we carry
the calculations all the way to age 120, when it is necessary for us to assume zero probability of
further survival (this assumption is inconsequential to the calculation but is necessary in order to
truncate it).
Substituting all of this information into equation 1 gives an estimate of $16.7 million for the
actuarial present value of Immelt’s lifetime pension entitlement as of the end of 2004.
26See http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/STATS/table4c6.html. This table gives the probability of death within
one year at each age between 0 and 119 for males and females. Using this information, it is straightforward to
calculate the probability of any person at age A surviving n years into the future. Note that the table is updated
periodically, and the mortality probabilities used in our calculations exhibit minor diﬀerences from those currently
posted.
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Comparison of sample companies with other S&P 500 companies
Descriptive statistics for 237 firms used in a study of CEO pension plans, compared with
statistics for other firms in the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index at year-end 2002.  All data are
sample means for the year 2002, and dollar values are in millions.  The right column shows the
p-value of a t-test for the difference in sample means.  The sample of 237 firms includes all
public companies in the 2002 Fortune 500 ranking of the largest U.S. firms that have a complete
history of data on the ExecuComp database from 1993 to 2002.  Because the sample of 237 firms
includes 11 that do not belong to the S&P 500 Index, the total number of companies studied in
this table equals 511.  All information in the table is obtained from ExecuComp or company
proxy statements.  Stock option award values are based upon ExecuComp’s Black-Scholes
method.  The indicator variable for CEO pay/service pension equals 1 if ExecuComp reports a
positive value for the variable measuring years service accrued for pension.  A small number of
observations have missing values for certain variables.
Variable
Observations
Annual sales
Sales growth (1 year)
Market capitalization
Return on assets (EBITDA)
Return to shareholders (1 year)
Return to shareholders (5 years)
Firm age (years since IPO)
Manufacturing industry 
Financial industry
Technology industry
Healthcare industry
CEO age
CEO years tenure
CEO salary and bonus
CEO option award value
CEO pay/service pension indicator
Sample
firms
237
$14,479
1.1 %
$22,978
12.0 %
-9.9 %
2.1 %
41
40 %
16 %
9 %
8 %
56
7
$2.58
$2.79
0.62
Rest of 
S&P 500
274
$10,283
-0.5 %
$10,110
11.6 %
-19.5 %
1.9 %
27
24 %
16 %
21 %
12 %
55
8
$1.81
$5.12
0.44
P-value
of t-test
0.03 **
0.47
0.00 ***
0.66
0.00 ***
0.87
0.00 ***
0.00 ***
0.99
0.00 ***
0.13
0.07 *
0.14
0.00 ***
0.08 *
0.00 ***
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.Table III
Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics for variables related to CEO and firm characteristics for a sample of 1,659
observations from 237 Fortune 500 companies in the 1996-2002 period.  Pension actuarial values
are calculated based upon assumptions given in the text.  Equity value equals the value of
common stock plus stock options, calculated according to Black-Scholes methodology.  Cash
compensation is the value of annual salary and bonus.  Leverage equals total debt, both short-
and long-term, divided by total debt plus either the book value or market value of equity. 
Distance to default is the number of standard deviations decrease in firm value that would be
required for a firm to default on its debt, according to assumptions given in the text.  Distance to
default is not calculated for firms with market leverage below 1%.
CEO variables
Age
Pension indicator
Pension actuarial value (mm.)
Equity ownership value (mm.)
Pension value / equity value
Annual cash compensation (mm.)
Annual pension increment (mm.)
Annual change in pension (mm.)
CEO’s years as CEO
CEO’s years employed with firm
CEO outside hire indicator
CEO in founding family indicator
CEO percent ownership
Mean
57.2
0.78
$4.5
$416.3
0.18
$2.3
$1.0
$1.0
6.61
22.16
0.18
0.14
1.19%
Std. Dev.
6.9
$7.7
$3,192.9
0.35
$2.2
$2.0
$2.3
7.07
12.10
4.27%
25
th %
ile
53
$0.3
$16.0
0.01
$1.2
$0.0
$0.0
2
13
0.05%
Median
58
$2.7
$38.2
0.07
$1.8
$0.5
$0.4
4
23
0.11%
75
th %
ile
62
$5.7
$104.8
0.20
$2.7
$1.0
$1.3
9
32
0.31%
Firm variables
Total assets (bn.)
Net sales (bn.)
Return on assets (EBITDA)
Equity market capitalization (bn.)
Equity volatility
Leverage (market value of equity)
Leverage (book value of equity)
Research & development / sales
Distance to default
Tax loss carry-forward indicator
Zero-dividend indicator
Years since date of founding
Number of industry segments
Board size
Percent of outside directors
Institutional investor ownership
$36.5
$12.4
16.1%
$24.8
0.372
0.267
0.565
0.023
3.15
0.211
0.144
91.95
2.54
12.10
79.2%
61.1%
$88.9
$14.2
10.6%
$46.5
0.147
0.212
0.278
0.047
1.10
45.33
1.97
3.46
11.0%
14.9%
$4.8
$4.3
9.0%
$4.8
0.277
0.092
0.361
0
2.39
61
1
10
73.3%
51.0%
$12.0
$7.5
15.1%
$9.5
0.346
0.211
0.566
0
2.97
94
2
12
81.8%
62.6%
$29.3
$14.5
22.1%
$22.8
0.435
0.421
0.790
0.025
3.72
120
3
14
87.5%
72.1%Table IV
Mean values of elements of CEO compensation, by age
Descriptive statistics for variables related to CEO compensation and pensions for a sample of
1,659 observations from 237 Fortune 500 companies in the 1996-2002 period.  Increments to
pension actuarial values are calculated based upon assumptions given in the text.  Stock options
awards are valued according to Black-Scholes methodology as reported by ExecuComp.  All
dollar values are in millions. In each column the annual pension increment is calculated based
upon fewer observations than the other variables, since it requires the use of year-over-year
differences in certain variables.
All
CEOs
Age
46-50
Age
51-55
Age
56-60
Age
61-65
Age
66+
Observations 1,656 175 385 509 423 104
Salary $0.9 $0.8 $0.9 $1.0 $1.0 $1.0
Bonus $1.4 $1.2 $1.3 $1.5 $1.6 $1.8
Stock option awards $5.8 $6.1 $6.0 $4.9 $5.1 $7.0
Restricted stock awards $0.9 $1.0 $0.7 $0.9 $0.9 $1.2
Long-term incentive payouts $0.5 $0.5 $0.4 $0.5 $0.8 $0.3
Annual increment to pension value $1.0 $0.4 $0.7 $1.1 $1.6 $0.8
Total compensation $10.6 $9.9 $10.0 $10.5 $10.9 $12.0
Change in pension / total comp. 0.10 0.04 0.08 0.11 0.15 0.04
Pension value / equity value 0.18 0.05 0.14 0.23 0.27 0.05
Fraction of CEOs for whom 
(pension value / equity value) > 
firm’s (debt value / equity value)
0.13 0.05 0.07 0.17 0.22 0.03Table V
Form and structure of CEO pensions
Incidence and structure of CEO pensions in a sample of 1,659 observations from 237 Fortune
500 companies in the 1996-2002 time period.  Data is obtained from annual company proxy
filings.  The presence of workforce defined benefit plans is based upon whether Compustat
reports a nonzero value for assets held in a defined benefit pension plan.  CEO retirement ages
are tabulated within the subsample of 1,286 observations for firms whose CEOs have accrued
non-zero pensions.   Data in the right column are based upon the 1,076 observations for which
pensions are calculated according to the widely used pay/service formula, which is the product
of average compensation times years employed times a multiplier factor.  The final section of the
table reports the payout currently accrued by each CEO, not the payout that a CEO might expect
to receive if he worked until normal retirement age.
Incidence of CEO pensions,
tabulated by type of plan
Pay/service formula
Cash balance
Negotiated by contract
Pension frozen from defunct plan
No pension
Incidence of CEO pensions,
tabulated by incidence of
workforce defined benefit plans
Firms with workforce plans
Firms without workforce plans
Minimum CEO retirement age
to obtain full pension benefits
55
60
62
65
Other
65%
7%
6%
< 1%
22%
90%
20%
3%
11%
9%
76%
1%
Items included in calculation of
average compensation
Salary
Bonus
Restricted stock awards
Long-term incentive plans
Years of compensation averaged
to calculate annual payout
1
3
4
5
Fraction of final average
compensation in annual payout
Less than 20.1%
20.1% - 30.0%
30.1% - 40.0%
40.1% - 50.0%
50.1% - 60.0%
60.1% - 70.0%
More than 70.0%
100%
94%
4%
4%
5%
39%
3%
54%
9%
9%
12%
23%
31%
14%
2%Table VI
Determinants of CEO’s inside debt holdings
Tobit regression estimates of the actuarial present value of a CEO’s pension, shown unadjusted
in the left column, scaled by salary and bonus in the center column, and scaled by the value of
the CEO’s ownership of shares and options in the right column.  Pension values are estimated
using actuarial assumptions given in the text.  Stock option values are based upon Black-Scholes
calculations.  Leverage equals total debt over total debt plus stockholders’ equity.  The dummy
variable for liquidity constrained firms equals 1 if the firm has negative operating income.  The
dummy variable for tax status equals 1 if the firm has an operating loss carry-forward.  T-
statistics based upon standard errors clustered at the firm level appear in parentheses below each
estimate.  The dependent variables are multiplied by 10
6 and 10
1in the center and right columns,
respectively, to improve display of the estimates.  Industry dummy variables are based upon the
Fama-French definitions of industry portfolios provided in Kenneth French’s asset pricing data
library
Dependent variable:
CEO’s years employed by firm
CEO hired from outside firm
dummy
Firm size (log of total assets)
Leverage (book value)
Liquidity constraint dummy
(negative operating income)
Growth opportunities 
(R&D / sales)
Tax status 
(carry-forward dummy)
Years since founding of firm
Pension value
0.252 ***
(5.22)
3.484 ***
(3.35)
1.921 **
(2.15)
4.655 ***
(2.57)
2.336
(1.49)
-18.184
(1.23)
-0.055
(0.08)
0.028 ***
(2.90)
Pension value ÷
(salary+bonus)
0.108 ***
(9.62)
1.494 ***
(4.78)
-0.018
(0.14)
1.420 ***
(3.02)
0.129
(0.26)
-1.537
(0.41)
0.030
(0.13)
0.012 ***
(3.65)
Pension value ÷
(stock+options)
0.089 ***
(5.21)
1.104 **
(2.40)
-0.196
(1.31)
1.889 ***
(2.85)
0.588
(0.84)
-3.459
(0.86)
0.071
(0.23)
0.015 ***
(3.49)
Other regression controls: institutional ownership (%), log of board size, percent of outside directors,
CEO membership in founding family, year indicator variables, industry indicator variables.
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.Table VII
Logit estimates for CEO turnover as a function of pension compensation
Logistic regression estimates of the probability of CEO turnover.  The sample includes observations for a
panel of 237 Fortune 500 companies during the 1996-2002 period.  The dependent variable equals 1 if the
CEO leaves his position during the last half of the fiscal year or the first half of the subsequent fiscal year. 
The pension start age indicator equals 1 if the CEO’s reported age is within one year of the age at which
he has the right to immediate payout of his full pension, if any.  The pension past payable indicator equals
1 if the CEO’s age exceeds by more than one year the age at which he had the right to immediate payout
of his full pension, if any.  Excess stock return equals the difference between the raw stock return and the
CRSP value-weighted index, compounded continuously.  T-statistics robust to serial correlation and
heteroskedasticity appear below each estimate in parentheses.
All
turnover
Forced
turnover
Planned
turnover
Planned
turnover
Pension start age indicator
Pension start age indicator
x indicator for start age = 65
Pension past payable indicator
Pension past payable indicator
x indicator for CEO age 64, 65 or 66
Excess stock return, prior two years
Member of founding family
CEO percentage ownership
Years tenure as CEO
Observations
CEO age dummy variables
Year dummy variables
Mean of dependent variable
% classified correctly
0.950 **
(3.27)
1.151 ***
(3.57)
-0.849 ***
(3.34)
-0.989 **
(2.17)
-3.093
(0.84)
0.013
(0.84)
1,616
Yes
Yes
0.106
89.5%
0.896
(1.60)
-0.548
(0.47)
-1.867 ***
(5.53)
-0.496
(0.71)
4.484
(1.02)
0.011
(0.31)
1,616
Yes
Yes
0.029
97.0%
1.229 **
(4.09)
1.558 ***
(4.94)
0.230
(0.79)
-1.209 **
(2.36)
-3.141
(0.72)
0.028 *
(1.76)
1,616
Yes
Yes
0.077
92.7%
-0.001
(0.001)
2.836 *
(3.46)
1.529 ***
(4.23)
1.774 **
(2.31)
0.295
(0.97)
-1.079 **
(2.09)
-1.993
(0.52)
0.026 *
(1.66)
1,616
Yes
Yes
0.077
93.2%
Other regression controls: institutional ownership (%), log of board size, percent of outside directors, leverage
(book value), market-to-book ratio.
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level.Table VIII
Estimates of default risk as a function of CEOs’ inside debt and equity holdings
Fixed effects estimates of firms’ default risk.  Default risk is measured as the distance to default,
which equals the number of standard deviations of reduction in the market value of the firm that
would place it below the default barrier (a more complete definition appears in the text).  The
key explanatory variables utilize the CEO’s personal debt/equity ratio, which has the pension’s
actuarial present value in the numerator, and the market value of shares and options in the
denominator.  For the firm, the debt/equity ratio equals the book value of total debt over the
market value of common stock.  CEO pension value is calculated using assumptions given in the
text.  The number of industry segments, a measure of diversification, equals the number of
business units for which the company reports disaggregated line-of-business data in its annual
report.  Fixed effects are specified by assigning a separate intercept to each unique CEO-firm
pair.  The sample includes 1,659 observations for 237 Fortune 500 firms between 1996-2002,
and the regression omits firms with minimal amounts of debt outstanding.  T-statistics appear
below each estimate in parentheses.
Dependent variable: distance to default Estimate Estimate Estimate
Firm size (log of total assets)
Leverage (book value)
Number of industry segments in firm
CEO’s pension value / 
CEO’s stock and option value 
Indicator for 
CEO’s pension/equity>firm’s debt/equity
0.122
(1.85)
-0.400
(2.73)
0.011
(0.74)
0.141
(1.97)
*
***
**
0.124
(1.90)
-0.203
(1.39)
0.007
(0.45)
0.436
(6.23)
*
***
0.124
(1.90)
-0.206
(1.39)
0.007
(0.46)
0.011
(0.14)
0.432
(5.90)
*
***
Firms
Firm-CEO pairs
Total observations
Year dummy variables
R
2
233
405
1,570
Yes
0.820
233
405
1,570
Yes
0.826
233
405
1,570
Yes
0.826
Other regression controls:  institutional ownership (%), log of board size, percent of outside directors, market-to-
book ratio.
Significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.Table A1
General Electric Co. executive pension disclosure
The table shows information from the company’s proxy statement filed March 4, 2005, page 35.
Employees are generally eligible to retire with unreduced benefits under company retirement
plans at age 60 or later, and with Social Security benefits at age 62 or later. The approximate
annual retirement benefits provided under company retirement plans and Social Security for GE
employees in higher salary classifications retiring directly from the company at age 62 or later
are shown in the table below.
Estimated total annual retirement benefits under the GE Pension Plan,
the GE Supplementary Pension Plan, the GE Excess Benefit Plan and Social Security
Years of service at retirement
Earnings credited
for
retirement benefits
20 25 30 35 40
$3,000,000 $1,062,300 $1,323,570 $1,584,840 $1,800,000 $1,800,000
$3,500,000 $1,237,300 $1,542,320 $1,847,340 $2,100,000 $2,100,000
$4,000,000 $1,412,300 $1,761,070 $2,109,840 $2,400,000 $2,400,000
$4,500,000 $1,587,300 $1,979,820 $2,372,340 $2,700,000 $2,700,000
$5,000,000 $1,762,300 $2,198,570 $2,634,840 $3,000,000 $3,000,000
$5,500,000 $1,937,300 $2,417,320 $2,897,340 $3,300,000 $3,300,000
$6,000,000 $2,112,300 $2,636,070 $3,159,840 $3,600,000 $3,600,000
$6,500,000 $2,287,300 $2,854,820 $3,422,340 $3,900,000 $3,900,000
$7,000,000 $2,462,300 $3,073,570 $3,684,840 $4,200,000 $4,200,000
$7,500,000 $2,637,300 $3,292,320 $3,947,940 $4,500,000 $4,500,000
$8,000,000 $2,812,300 $3,511,070 $4,209,840 $4,800,000 $4,800,000
$8,500,000 $2,987,300 $3,729,820 $4,472,340 $5,100,000 $5,100,000
$9,000,000 $3,162,300 $3,948,570 $4,734,840 $5,400,000 $5,400,000
Note: The amounts shown above are applicable to employees retiring in 2005 at age 62 and
assume the employee was first eligible to participate in the GE Pension Plan before January 1,
2005.
Amounts shown as “earnings credited for retirement benefits” in this table represent the average
annual covered compensation paid for the highest 36 consecutive months out of the last 120
months prior to retirement. For 2004, covered compensation for the individuals named . . . is the
same as the total of their salary and bonus amounts.  As of February 10, 2005, the GE executive
officers listed had the following years of credited service with the company: Mr. Immelt, 22
years . . . The approximate annual retirement benefits provided under company retirement plans
are payable in fixed monthly payments for life, with a guaranteed minimum term of five years.$0
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Figure 1
Mean and median actuarial present values for CEO pensions by age
Mean and median actuarial present values for pensions held by CEOs in a sample of 237 Fortune
500 companies in the 1996-2002 period, including zero-valued observations which comprise 23
percent of the 1,659 CEO-year observations.  Pension values are calculated based upon
assumptions given in the text, using information disclosed in company proxy statements.60 or less 61 62 63 64 65 or more
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Figure 2
Annual CEO turnover rates by age, as a function of pension availability
Annual frequencies of voluntary CEO turnover at different ages within a sample of 237 Fortune
500 companies between 1996 and 2002.  The entire sample includes 1,659 annual observations,
but the chart is drawn from a subsample of 1,264 observations, excluding those CEO-years for
which no pension plan was in effect and also excluding cases of involuntary turnover.  The top
line shows turnover rates for CEOs who are exactly at the age at which their pensions become
fully payable, comprising a total of 61 observations (no CEOs have pension start ages of 61 or
64).  The middle line shows turnover rates for CEOs who are past the pension start age, a total of
124 observations.   The bottom line shows turnover rates for CEOs who are younger than the
pension start age, a total of 1,079 observations.SIFR Research Report Series
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